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The Joy of Lex
Some Things to Consider. . .
What is language? What are the different forms of language? What is connotation,
and how do discrepancies among perceptions of connotative meaning affect our
communication? Is language itself a dynamic entity with an evolutionary tract of its
own, or is it molded by the social being? To what extend does an individual have
control over language? What is a metaphor? How is it that synonyms mean the same
thing, yet differ in meaning- what does synonymous mean? The most effective means
of communication differs from person to person; some most easily derive and express
meaning via representations, others find solace in speech, still others are most
comfortable with written words. . .Why? What are the components of language which
make analysis of it so complex?
Unto the Breach . . . Once More
Name withheld upon request
Every language (pause) has its own silences. And as British actor Ralph
Richardson once observed, "The most precious things in speech are pauses." Meaning,
one might say, lies in the breach.
As a lifelong stammerer, I've cultivated some defensively fanciful notions about the
hesitations, the stranded syllables, and the involuntary repetitions that characterize
impedimented speech. If thought is made in the mouth (though doubtless there are a
gifted few who can think without moving their lips), how truly . . . disappointing that
thought generally is. Like Eliot's Sweeney, "I've gotta use words when I talk to you."
Uh . . . unfortunately.

Hesitations in speech are often interpreted as struggles to "gather one's thoughts"-as if articulating an idea were somehow akin to collecting flowers in a thorny
meadow. But might the primitive "uh" itself signify the "limits of my language, . . .
the limits of my world"? Does the awkward pause point to all that "we must consign
to silence"? And, if so, are such hung syllables and uninvited ellipses therefore the
truest indicators of thought? Blessedly terse, Wittgenstein reserved further comment.
Marshall McLuhan (baffling as ever) characterized language as "a form of
organized stutter." French playwright Antonin Artaud insisted that all "true language
is incomprehensible"--without insisting on a definition of "true language." Rejecting
the Johnsonian metaphor of language as the dress of thought, Carlyle chose instead to
describe language as "the flesh-garment, the body, of thought." Meanwhile, Harpo
Marx simply squeezed an old bicycle horn and sought refuge in music.
And so I recommend none of the above as fit topics for today's discussion on
language. Instead, with some (customary) hesitation, I urge you to read T. S. Eliot's
"Little Gidding." Or, uh, re-read it.

From T.S. Elliot's "Little Gidding":
It would be the same, when you leave the rough road
And turn behind the pigsty to the dull facade
And the Tombstone. And what you thought you came for
Is only a shell, a husk of meaning
From which the purpose breaks only when it is fulfilled
If at all. Either you had no purpose
Or the purpose is beyond the end you figured
And is altered in fulfillment.

Skimming the Surface
By: Carol Linskey

Dr. Noble once began a class by saying that he heard a profound thing-that
education is learning vocabularies and what they mean. Later in my career, Dr. Arens
taught a history of East Central Europe with a format grounded in the division of these
cultures by common language, making cultural boundaries easier for us to grapple
with. But as I turn to the task at hand, presented with questions on the nature of
language, such as the connection between signifier and signified, the dynamics of
language, communication, and (my favorite and yours) metaphors, it seems to me that
language, as in personalities turned self-conscious, misconstrues itself. Language is an
intricate part of being human, defined as both rational and social, so I was not a little
surprised to read in my Encyclopedia of Philosophy that "There is no single specialist
work on the history of the philosophy of language." So perhaps I shall do
as Perseus and use reflection to conquer my Gorgon, and begin with a historiophilosophic approach.
About a year ago or so, Dr. Nordqust gave a faculty lecture addressing our feelings
about computers and the fact that they're here. He used, for example, Socrates' distrust
of the writing-a "fad" two and a half millennia ago. Criticizing that writing would
only ruin our minds and make thinking lazy, Socrates never wrote. Plato, perhaps
mindful of his master's position on the subject, made Socrates the star of his
dialogues. In Cratylus, Plato defines names as an "instrument of teaching and
distinguishing natures" (388c). Plato argues that names or words are neither arbitrary
nor conventional, but "ideal," or fitting the "universal form" of the thing named. The
problems presented by ideal language are still being worked out, as evidenced in our
current mindfulness of "politically-correct" speech.
Language cannot be "real" to Plato, dynamic and fluctuating as it is, so Aristotle set
out to give some stability to language with his work on categorizing symbols and
developing logic to a form that has a long and enduring legacy. He says words are the
signs of ideas, and ideas the sign of things. However, for centuries logic can only be
talked about in terms of universal categories. Quantification is a very recently devised
tool, useful in the discussion of particulars, but it needed a "particularly-minded"
world view.
Aristotle's groundwork found a fertile place in Medieval times in the work of
the Scholastics such as Aquinas, Averroes, Ockham, and Duns Scotus. Here we see
the propositions for the sake of argument, definitions of terms in the propositions, and
logical conclusions based upon these definitions. The writings could be said to be at
the same time profound and taxing. So by the 17th century, hordes of thinkers were
turning away from Scholasticism toward science (I think, the reason Voltaire called
this historical period the "Dark Ages" is directly because of his distaste for this
method of teaching). Sir Francis Bacon is credited (by Russell in his History of
Western Philosophy) as being the first to say "knowledge is power," yet he warns

against the "Idols of the Marketplace" which construes language as reality. Goethe's
Faust changed John 1.1, "In the beginning was the word" (or mind or spirit), and
replaced it with "In the beginning was the act!" Another John, John Locke, wrote that
words were the substitutes for ideas (in Lockean terms, the primary, unchanging
objects of the mind). It may seem to go without saying that "a group of words forming
no idea(s) is incoherent," but he said it. And remember, when we hear the words, "We
hold these words to be self-evident. . ." we can thank Locke.
Metaphors. . .wait. Wittgenstein said we cannot think without language. This may
be true, but need I know the word "tree" when I have the experience of one? Now,
isn't the word "tree" a metaphor of my experience, and if a metaphor is literal, why is
it a metaphor? Similarly, knowledge is not the same as understanding or we wouldn't
have two different designations. A. J. Ayer wrote, "a statement is held to be literally
meaningful if and only if it is either analytic or empirically verifiable." So what about
the statement "God exists"? Is it meaningless to have mystery and to believe in the
existence of something before it has been defined for you as "something which
nothing greater can be conceived" (Anselm).
So are words the same as language? What about music, or gestures? How about the
electrified sensation of silence? And finally, what about the sensation of hearing or
saying something profound? Can you put words to that, ideal words, and increase the
profundity indefinitely?

Communication and Meaning
By: Mike Zehr
Written language, while sharing the same symbolic content as spoken language, is
rarely as rich or subtle as it's verbal counterpart. Humans depend upon a thousand
nonverbal and verbal clues imbedded in the speech and mannerisms of those around
us. One can read Shakespear, but to truly get the full effect, it must be seen, each
performance imparting some subtly different meaning as the actors interpret the words
of a play whose original subtle meaning may be as dead as the man who wrote them.
This, of course, leads to misunderstandings, quite frequently for me, although
perhaps not as often for others. People read meaning into the written word as if it were
spoken, and when the writer has a sarcastic bent, such as I do, problems arise. More

than once a letter or note I have left for friends has been met with irritation as the
sarcasm of my words was overlooked, and my meaning taken literally.
How often has the tone of voice that you use been misconstrued? Words intended to
be humorous or funny are read instead as being sarcastic or serious as others interpret
the tone of voice differently than was intended?
How effective is language for conveying meaning? Philosophers, mathematicians,
scientists, and writers often go to great lengths to define words that they use, not
because the words have no previous meaning, but because they have such a plethora
of meaning that , if merely tossed out to the reader casually, they would cause more
confusion and argument than if the works had been written in some entirely new
language.
One can not go around defining all of the words that they use in common, everyday
speech, however. Many of the words that we bandy about with such ease, if asked, we
would be hard pressed to put a firm definition to, let alone explain the additional
meaning added by our tone, stance, the tilt of a head or wink of an eye.
Indeed, most of the communications shared by people are, at best, mutually shared
symbols, with no guarantee that both parties share the same meaning. We fill in
blanks in context and meaning almost automatically, correcting for spelling or
pronunciation errors, and assigning meaning to phrases, whether the meaning attached
was intended or not.
What do you mean, mean?
By: -t.
Noam Chompsky (for whom, i admit, i held much contempt during my advanced
grammar class) said that the point of language is "the free expression of thought."
What is "free"? What is "expression"? And what is "thought"? You may be thinking,
"frankly, scallop, I don't give a clam" (Pinkard and Bowden)-but what does
that mean?
The act of communication is necessarily social. What meaning would
communication itself have if not for our fellow Homo Sapiens? Many philosophers
believe that the dynamic social being, through its traditions, customs, and evolution,
determines both how we "ought" to communicate and how our means of expression
will be construed by others. Tones, gestures, body language, layers of connotations

and associations, and countless other attributes which contribute to meaning, vary
among cultures, communities, or even individuals.
What is the unification which allows us to continue communicating while
maintaining individual, unique means of doing so? If our use of language is socially
determined, how free is our expression of thought? If we accept or acknowledge this
social influence upon us, is it solely our means of expression which the social being
subjugates, or are our thoughts themselves to some extent determined by it?
It is not just our use of language that is interesting, but also our understanding of it.
If someone tells us "The cats are hungry," how is it that we perceive, in the
terminology of J.L. Austin, the locutionary act-the expression of the proposition that
the cats are hungry, the illocutionary act-the expression of the belief that the cats are
hungry, and the perlocutionary act-the attempt to cause belief in the listener that the
cats are hungry? Further, a tone of voice, facial expression, etc. may suggest to the
listener that he or she is expected to act upon the proposition, i.e., feed the poor darn
hungry cats. (We'll consider how we knew the cats were hungry at some other time. .
.) Or perhaps the Cats are a sports team and "hungry" is meant to refer to their desire
and drive to win rather than to eat, in which case the listener would not, generally, be
presented with a problem requiring some corrective action. Context, context.
Are semantics (grammatical meaning) and ontological meaning (being) related?
Are they related in that without one we cannot have full comprehension of the other,
and if so, is that relation reciprocal? Asking what the word "rose" means lexically or
connotationaly is not the same as asking what it means to be a rose. We can say that a
rose is a flower that grows on a shrub of the genus Rosa, or that it represents love,
fragility, beauty within a finite temporal space, etc. But does the rose itself have
meaning. . . and from where do our associations originate? How do denotations and
connotations last and evolve? What makes an effective metaphor effective? What
makes a statement "profound"?
To tie back into the introduction, as is the custom, "Frankly, scallop, I don't give a
clam" is a fishy way of expressing cold disinterest. But what does that mean? (For the
intelligent derrieres: that. (thät). Relative pronoun. Being the one indicated or
implied.) For the rest of us-who are neversarcastic-perhaps we can get together and
freely express our thoughts on the matter, provided we can circumvent determinism
successfully enough to have our own thoughts, whatever those might Be.

Fall Meeting Schedule
All meetings, held at 8:30 p.m. in Gamble Hall, room 106, are free and open to everyone.

Wednesday. . .
September 24
October 8 & 22
November 5 & 19

Announcements
•
•

Look for the Philosophical Debate table on AASU Day-- Thursday, Oct 9th
We have several activities planned for this year, among which are sponsoring
the 2nd annual Philosophical Essay Contest, sponsoring a speaker in the
Spring, and hosting social gatherings. If you would like to help with fundraises, or would like to make a donation, please contact us.

•

The Thought Box is located in The Writing Center, Gamble Hall, room 109. It
is there for convenient submission to The Philosopher's Stone, suggestions for
future topics, requests to be on our mailing list, or any thoughts that you would
like to share with us.

•

Submissions to The Philosopher's Stone may address any philosophical issue,
compare philosophical ideas, propose new topics for discussion, or address any
previous newsletter article or topic. Works must be 250 words or less and
include name and phone number.

Faculty Advisor: Dr. Erik Nordenhaug, 921-7322. E-mail: nordener@pirates.
armstrong.edu.
Student president: Tiffanie L.C. Rogers 1-888-964-9543 (punch in your # at the
beep)

